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Abstract 
This paper attempts to elucidate whether firm performance and macroeconomic conditions play a 
significant role in explaining credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Our panel dataset covers 112 reference 
entities in four markets (South Korea, Hong Kong, France, and Germany) for the period 2001-12. Overall, 
our results suggest that market value indicators (Tobin’s Q, stock market returns, and the interest rate) 
appear to be more important than book value indicators (i.e., ROA, ROE, and the GDP growth rate) in 
determining CDS spreads. Moreover, Asian CDS markets are shown to be more sensitive to both GDP 
and stock market volatility, than the two European markets. Finally, the 2007-09 global financial crisis 
may have significantly affected the CDS market as a whole, but it generally did not affect the individual 
markets. These results are robust to various model specifications. This paper contributes to the 
understanding of CDS determinants at firm-, economy-, and market-level. 
JEL classifications:  G10, G15, G32 
Keywords: credit default swaps, structural models, firm performance, macroeconomic conditions, 
financial crisis, GARCH volatility 
1. Introduction 
First introduced circa 1994 by JP Morgan, credit derivatives have substantially expanded over the past 
decade. Since their development, credit default swaps (CDSs) have attracted a wide range of users, from 
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banks and other financial institutions to corporate and supranational bodies. According to Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) statistics, the gross notional amount of CDS trading was $25.9 
trillion as of the year-end of 2011, and the net notional amount stood at $2.7 trillion. As their primary 
function, CDSs provide lenders with a form of protection against the occurrence of a credit event—
borrower (reference entity) default. The formation of a CDS contract involves the following conventional 
setting: When a lender (the protection buyer) purchases a CDS from an insurance company or another 
financial institution (the protection seller), the loan becomes an asset that may be swapped for cash in the 
event of loan default. If no credit event occurs, the protection buyer makes premium payments until the 
contract matures; however, if a credit event occurs, then the protection seller pays the buyer for the loss, 
and the contractual relationship ends.  
Undoubtedly, the key feature of a financial product is the “price”, which is represented by the “spread” 
in the case of CDSs. In a CDS contract, the amount of the protection premium, which is the annual 
amount that the protection buyer must pay the protection seller over the length of the contract, can be 
calculated from the “CDS spread”.  As with any other insurance product, the CDS spread can be regarded 
as the price of risk. Any changes in factors that could alter the perceived level of risk will cause an 
adjustment in the CDS spread. Given the emerging significance of CDSs as a risk management product in 
financial markets over the past decade, further knowledge about the determinants of CDS spreads will 
certainly provide more insight into the probability of default and ensure that both financial regulators and 
risk managers better understand the use of CDS contracts. In actual fact, this remains the main motivation 
of our current research. 
The present paper aims to further contribute to the understanding of CDS pricing by expanding the 
search for CDS determinants to a multi-level dimension. Fundamentally, we employ a structural model 
and examine factors at three levels: microeconomic (firm); macroeconomic (economy); and across four 
markets in two continents (market), that theoretically contain information about CDS spreads. To facilitate 
a comparative study, we select four international CDS markets from two continents – Asia and Europe. 
The vast majority of studies in CDS employ US dataset (e.g., Houweling & Vorst, 2005; Ericsson, Jacobs, 
& Oviedo, 2009; Zhang, Zhou & Zhu, 2009; Cao, Yu, & Zhong, 2010; Bai & Wu, 2011; Doshi, Ericsson, 
Jacobs, & Turnbull, 2013; Galil, Shapir, Amiram, & Ben-Zion, 2014), while researches on other markets 
are relatively limited (e.g., Monfort & Renne, 2014; Doshi, Jacobs, & Zurita, 2014). We purposely choose 
Hong Kong, South Korea, France, and Germany for our study due to two main reasons: 1) Hong Kong is a 
major Asian financial hub which provides important services in international finance, whereas some South 
Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai play a significant role in the global economy. 2) France 
and Germany1 are the two largest Euro-denominated CDS markets. With this approach, we aim to capture 
any region/market-specific variations—that is, we wish to examine whether our results are affected by a 
market’s geographical location. The hypothesized outcome is that, either: (i) no differences exist, i.e., all 
CDS markets are the same (homogeneous), or (ii) due to geographic and cultural reasons, the two Asian 
markets are similar, whereas the two European markets are alike; in other words, we can classify the four 
markets into either the Asian market group or the European market group. 
The present paper has three distinctive features: first, as microeconomic variables, we include both 
market value and book value firm performance measures; second, we simultaneously examine both levels 
of and changes in CDS spreads; and third, we conduct two separate studies of our data by initially 
aggregating the CDS data from the four markets, and is then followed by a comparative analysis of the 
four markets. Our overall empirical results show that (i) Tobin’s Q has a significantly negative impact on 
CDS spread levels and changes in all samples except for the Korean subsample, whereas ROA plays a 
                                                 
1 According to Benos, Wetherilt and Zikes (2013), the UK CDS market is relatively small in terms of values traded 
and trading frequency. 
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significantly negative role in explaining the level of CDS spreads mainly in the full sample and in some 
subsamples; (ii) stock market returns and the risk-free interest rate have a significantly negative impact on 
CDS spread levels and changes in all samples except for the Korean subsample, whereas the GDP growth 
rate is significant with the expected sign in only the Korean and French subsamples; (iii) followed by the 
interest rate and stock market returns, Tobin’s Q has the strongest economic significance; (iv) GDP 
volatility and stock market volatility have a significant positive impact on CDS spread levels and changes 
only in Asian economies; and (v) a significantly positive relationship exists between the 2007 global 
financial crisis and CDS spread levels, primarily for the full sample. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews scholarly advances in the study of 
CDS spreads. Section 3 describes our analytical framework in terms of hypothesis setting. In Section 4, 
we provide a brief discussion of our estimation methodology; variables; models, and data used. Section 5 
provides an analysis of the empirical results. In Section 6, we conduct two robustness checks on our 
estimation results: (i) we expand our regressions by introducing a firm performance dummy variable as an 
explanatory variable; and (ii) we discuss the values of the adjusted R2 and F-statistics of the redundant 
fixed-effects test. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on CDS spreads can be divided into two main strands. Studies in the first strand focus on 
reduced-form models and examine the random shocks that affect CDS pricing; such studies often employ 
an event study methodology. Studies in the second strand apply structural models under the assumption 
that CDS spreads are driven by the default risk of the CDS reference entity. Thus, researchers in this 
strand of literature believe that CDS spreads function as an indicator of default risk that is triggered when 
the reference firm’s value falls below some threshold; in other words, the level of default risk is priced 
accordingly in CDS spreads. Although a vast body of studies have examined the determinants of credit 
spreads by utilizing both models, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Duffie and Singleton 
(1997) offer succinct summaries of the empirical findings to date. They maintain that the explanatory 
power of many theoretical models is rather limited and that further search for additional deterministic 
factors is desirable.  
2.1. Reduced-Form Models 
The development of reduced-form models began relatively recently in the 1990s. Some key researchers 
who have contributed to the development of such models include Lando (1994, 1998); Madan and Unal 
(1998); Jarrow and Turnbull (1995); Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997); Duffie and Singleton (1999); 
Hull and White (2000, 2001); Duffie and Lando (2001); Zhang et al. (2009); Doshi et al. (2013); Augustin 
and Tédongap (2016); and Galil et al. (2014). The underlying assumption of reduced-form models is 
rather different from that of structural models, in that the former treat default as an exogenously 
determined random shock, and as such, firm-specific factors or indeed any variables that could affect firm 
performance contain no information on the firm’s default probability. Despite the development of 
reduced-form models, many researchers prefer to use structural models because they perceive the lack of 
an economic rationale for reduced-form models as a major obstacle to applying such models and 
explaining their results. 
2.2. Structural Models 
Structural models are based on the option pricing model originally developed by Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1974). Unlike reduced-form models, structural models provide an intuitive framework for the 
deterministic relationship between credit risk factors and CDS spreads. Recent studies based on structural 
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models, including Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) and Tang and 
Yan (2006). These researches demonstrate that credit spreads have a negative relationship with interest 
rates and that while they vary with economic conditions, firm characteristics have significant explanatory 
power for credit spreads. Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, and Huang (2002) study CDS determinants by 
examining both macroeconomic and firm-specific variables such as asset volatility, stock price, leverage, 
rating, and market capitalization, and they conclude that these variables explain up to 82% of CDS 
pricing. Equivalently, Abid and Naifar (2006) examine the explanatory power of a structural model by 
estimating variables such as ratings, CDS contract maturity, stock volatility, risk-free interest rates and the 
slopes of yield curves and report that these variables can help to explain more than 60% of CDS pricing. 
Other contributions to the study of CDS determinants using the structure model framework include: 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Tang and Yan (2007), and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007). Specifically, 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) investigate the determinants of CDS spread changes by using monthly US 
industrial bond data and find explanatory power for both firm leverage and implied volatility. Although 
with limited statistical evidence (25% explanatory power of observed credit spread changes), their paper 
highlights the elusive nature of some of the more fundamental problems in the search for factors that help 
to explain credit spreads. 
3. The Hypotheses 
Our study of CDS spread determinants is also based on the structural model approach, as we analyze both 
firm-specific and macroeconomic factors. To facilitate our investigations, we develop four testable 
hypotheses. Hypothesis One (H1) entails the testing of firm-specific factors in the CDS determination.  
Previous studies such as Ericsson et al. (2009) and Galil et al. (2014) include one firm performance 
related variable – leverage, in their work, our paper extends the investigation by introducing three firm 
performance variables. This approach adds further vigorousness to the CDS research, and it forms a major 
contribution of this paper to the understanding of CDS determinants. Hypothesis Two (H2) follows 
closely the spirit of those work such as Tang and Yan (2006); Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007); and Baum 
and Wan (2010), in which the influence of macroeconomic conditions is maintained and tested. 
Hypothesis Three (H3) shares the consideration of Stulz (2010) and Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), by 
speculating an impact of financial crisis on the CDS markets. Similar to Doshi et al. (2014), Hypothesis 
Four (H4) assesses whether regional factor plays a role in CDS determination. The four hypotheses are 
summarized as follows: 
H1: Microeconomic factors such as firm performance contain information about CDS and ∆CDS. 
H2: Macroeconomic conditions, as captured by GDP, stock market returns and the interest rate, have 
explanatory power for CDS and ∆CDS. 
H3: The global financial crisis of 2007Q3-2009Q2 affected CDS and ∆CDS. 
H4: A geographic effect plays a role in the determination of CDS and ∆CDS. 
4. Methodology and Data 
4.1. Method 
As our dataset contains both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions, an unbalanced panel data 
estimation approach is adopted. Fixed effects with White Cross-Section Robust Standard Errors2 that 
                                                 
2 These standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation among cross sections. 
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control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are applied.3 Since our sample contains data with a time 
dimension, we estimate our regressions with an AR(1) process to account for the non-instantaneous 
adjustment of CDS spreads to changes in the explanatory variables.4 As a unique feature of this paper, in 
addition to estimating regressions for the full sample (4-Market) and hence treating all four markets as a 
single, homogenous market within the full sample dataset, we also estimate regressions for the reference 
entities in the four markets individually. Treating the data from all four markets as a single dataset 
implicitly assumes that these four national CDS markets are identical. This assumption is then relaxed in 
the second part of the regression process. We believe that this estimation method provides us with an 
opportunity to identify the possible existence of market-specific factors—which we term “geographic 
effect”5—that are obscured in the aggregated data, which adds robustness to our overall empirical results.  
4.2. Variables 
In contrast to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Galil et al. (2014), who investigate only CDS spread 
changes, in the eight equations that we test in this paper, we use two dependent variables, namely, CDS 
spread levels and changes, and 17 explanatory variables (level and change): three firm performance 
measures (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q); two economic indicators (GDP growth and GDP volatility); two 
stock market indicators (stock market returns and volatility); one interest rate (the 5-year swap rate); a 
financial crisis dummy; and an AR(1) error term. In this paper, all changes in explanatory variables are 
measured by using the formula ΔXi = Xt – Xt-1. 
4.2.1. CDS Spreads 
In this paper, we use “CDS” and “∆CDS” ( 1−−=∆ ttt CDSCDSCDS ) to represent CDS spread levels 
and CDS spread changes, respectively, which are the two independent variables in our regressions.  
4.2.2. Firm Performance 
As a major extension to Ericsson et al. (2009) and Galil et al. (2014),6 three firm performance ratios are 
used in our study. The first ratio is return on assets (ROA), which is calculated by dividing a firm’s net 
income (NI) by its total assets (TA).7 ROA measures firm profitability. As profitability increases, the 
probability of default decreases, and CDS declines. Alternatively, firm performance can be measured by 
                                                 
3 A key assumption of the least squares regression is that no omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory 
variables; otherwise, the estimates would be biased. The advantage of using fixed effects is that by assuming a 
constant iα , where ii zλαα += as a unique constant for each firm, we can include the unobservable variable z in 
the equation ititiit xy εβα ++= , thus rendering the least squares method possible. In this setup, the slope 
coefficient β  is the same for all i cross-sectional entities; however, the intercept terms iα vary across i but are 
constant over time. As we incorporate firm-specific effects on the CDS spread relationship, a model allowing for a 
different intercept for each individual reference entity would be the preferred estimation technique. Furthermore, 
our sample includes CDS spreads and firm-specific accounting data; hence, they would unlikely satisfy the 
standard assumption for estimating random effects on a random sample. 
4 We also estimate regressions on our two models without the AR(1) error structure and find that estimation results 
do not differ substantially. The results are available upon request. 
5 If transaction costs (inventory costs, order handling costs, and search costs) can be assumed to be constant across 
markets, differences should not exist between our aggregate-level and market-level regression results. 
6 Only firm leverage is included in their regressions. 
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return on equity (ROE), which is equal to net income divided by total equity (TE).8 As ROE represents the 
return to shareholders on their equity, a higher ratio indicates a lower likelihood of default and therefore a 
lower CDS. Another commonly used indicator of firm performance is Tobin’s Q (TBQ), which is defined 
as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its assets.9 When Tobin’s Q is 
greater than one, the current value of a firm’s assets is higher than the replacement cost, i.e., the firm is 
performing well, and the probability of default and CDS decline. The same logic can be applied to 
relationship between CDS spread changes and changes in these firm performance indicators. For example, 
when ΔROA is positive, the firm is performing well, and ΔCDS will be negative; hence, we continue to 
expect a negative relationship. Since the calculations of the three firm performance ratios share data such 
as net income, total income and total equity, a high degree of correlation may exist among them. Table 1 
reports the correlations among these ratios, and the correlations between ROA and ROE range from 55% 
to 81%. To avoid potential multicollinearity problems, we estimate the three firm performance indicators 
separately in Model 1 and Model 2.  
Table 1. ROA, ROE, and Tobin's Q correlations 
  ROA ROE 
 
4-Market 
ROE 0.55 
 TBQ 0.42 0.16 
 
KOR 
ROE 0.70 
 TBQ 0.66 0.67 
 
HKG 
ROE 0.81 
 TBQ 0.12 0.33 
 
FRA 
ROE 0.55 
 TBQ 0.50 0.13 
 
GER 
ROE 0.74 
 TBQ 0.54 0.29 
4.2.3. Macroeconomic Conditions 
A number of authors recognize the importance of macroeconomic conditions in the determination of credit 
spreads. For instance, Fama and French (1989), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Duffie et al. (2007) all 
document the contribution of macroeconomic conditions to credit spreads. In this paper, we examine the 
effects of a country’s macroeconomic conditions from three perspectives: economy, financial, and interest 
                                                 
8 
TE
NIROE = . 
9 
TA
DEBTMVEQ sTobin' += , where MVE is the market value of equity and DEBT represents the firm’s book value of 
debts (liabilities). MVE is the product of the bank’s closing share price at the end of the financial year and the number of 
common stock shares outstanding, DEBT is the book value of the bank's short-term debt plus the book value of the 
bank's long-term debt and TA is the book value of the total assets of the bank. As stated above, all of these required 
inputs are readily obtainable from the bank's basic financial and accounting information. 
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rates.10 Fluctuations in GDP are important indicators of the macroeconomic condition of an economy 
(e.g.,Tang and Yan, 2006). We study the economic health of a country by using two GDP variables - GDP 
growth rate (YGRT) 11  and GDP volatility (YVOL), which is the conditional volatility obtained from 
estimating a GARCH (1, 1) model.12 Our volatility measure is similar to that of Byrne and Davies (2005), 
Driver, Temple and Urga (2005), and Baum and Wan (2010). We expect a negative relationship between 
GDP growth and CDS spreads because when the economy is growing, business confidence increases, firm 
profitability rises, and hence CDS spreads decrease. By contrast, we expect the opposite relationship for 
GDP volatility, i.e., when fluctuations increase, economic uncertainty rises, the probability of firm default 
increases, and hence changes in CDS spreads increase.  
The findings of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Arnold and Vrugt 
(2008) show that stock market returns and volatility are important indicators of changes in the business 
climate. According to the contingent-claims framework, the features of a CDS resemble those of a short 
put option. As volatility increases option values, the link between CDS spreads and volatility becomes 
apparent. A positive stock return signifies a healthy business climate, and default risk is hence lower, or 
the probability of recovery is higher. By contrast, a more volatile stock market increases the likelihood of 
firm default. Overall, we believe that the functioning and movements of the stock market are important 
factors that we want to test in the CDS relationship. Unlike Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Galil et al. 
(2014), who use a stock market volatility index, we calculate stock market returns (SRTN)13 by using the 
stock index closing price (P) of the relevant country, and analogous to the GDP volatility computation, the 
stock market volatility (SVOL) calculation relies on the estimation of a GARCH (1,1) model. We expect 
that as stock market returns increase, economic confidence rises, and CDS decreases. Hence, a negative 
relationship should exist between stock market volatility and CDS. Moreover, we expect a positive 
relationship between CDS spreads and stock market volatility because when the business climate becomes 
more unstable, stock market volatility increases and CDS increases accordingly. As for the changes in the 
economic environment, we expect the same relationship for ΔCDS: when the change in economic 
volatility is positive, i.e., stability decreases, ΔCDS increases. 
Many previous studies include risk-free interest rates in their analyses. For instance, both Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) and Blanco et al. (2005) show that the risk-free rate contains information about CDS 
spreads. To study its effects, we use the 5-year swap rate (SWP)14 as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate, 
which determines the risk-adjusted drift of firm value. Therefore, an increase in the risk-free rate would 
tend to decrease risk-adjusted default probabilities and hence CDS spreads. We thus expect a negative 
relationship between the risk-free rate and CDS spreads. A positive change, i.e., rise, in the risk-free rate 
signals a decline in default probability, and hence, CDS spreads will fall. However, for a negative change, 
i.e., fall, in the risk-free rate, a negative ∆CDS follows, and vice versa; therefore, a negative relationship 
between the risk-free rate and ∆CDS is expected.  
                                                 
10 Our approach differs from that of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) in this respect, as they use only stock market (S&P 500) 
returns as a proxy for overall economic conditions. 
11 





=
−1
ln
t
t
t GDP
GDPYGRT . 
12 A GARCH (1, 1) model specifies that the conditional variance is a function of an intercept, a shock from the prior period 
and the variance from the last period. A similar approach employing a conditional volatility measure with more detailed 
descriptions can be found in Li (2007). 
13 






=
−1
ln
t
t
t P
PSRTN . 
14 These rates are 5-year government CDS spreads, sometimes also called the LIBOR zero rates, and they are considered to 
correspond closely to the opportunity cost of capital. See Blanco et al. (2005) for discussions on swap rates as risk-free rates. 
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4.2.4. Crisis 
The impact of the global financial crisis that began in 2007 has become an important consideration in 
recent research on the determinants of CDS spreads (see, e.g., Chiaramonte & Casu, 2013; Kress, 2011; 
Stulz, 2010; and Dickinson, 2008). To capture the potential effects of this global financial crisis on our 
hypothesized CDS spread relationships, the dummy variable Crisis is included in our estimations. This 
dummy variable is constructed by assigning “1” to the period from 2007Q3 through 2009Q2 and “0” for 
the rest of the sample. Many studies15 on the crisis effect divide their full sample into pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods and examine the differences between them. Owing to the relatively limited size of our 
sample, we believe that directly containing a crisis variable in our regression equations would be the 
preferred approach to minimize the small sample bias problem. For the purposes of our hypothesis testing, 
a positive relationship is expected between the crisis variable and our CDS and ∆CDS dependent 
variables. Table 2 displays the expected signs of the explanatory variables discussed above. 
Table 2. Explanatory variable and expected signs on estimated coefficients 
Explanatory 
variable 
  Dependent variable 
Description CDS 
ROA Return on assets - 
ROE Return on equity - 
TBQ Tobin's Q - 
PDMY Firm performance dummy - 
YGRT GDP growth rate - 
YVOL GDP volatility + 
SRTN Stock market return - 
SVOL Stock market volatility + 
SWP Swap rate - 
Crisis Crisis period dummy + 
 
 
ΔCDS 
ΔROA Change in return on assets - 
ΔROE Change in return on equity - 
ΔTBQ Change in Tobin's Q - 
ΔPDMY Change in firm performance dummy - 
ΔYGRT Change in GDP growth rate - 
ΔYVOL Change in GDP volatility + 
ΔSRTN Change in stock market return - 
ΔSVOL Change in stock market volatility + 
ΔSWP Change in swap rate - 
Crisis Crisis period dummy + 
4.3. Models 
Generally, the four hypotheses underlying our study can be represented by the following equation: 
titititii,t CrisisMacroMicroault SwapCredit Def ,,3,2,1 εβββα ++++=             (M) 
                                                 
15 E.g. Galil et al. (2014). 
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where the dependent variable, i,tult SwapCredt Defa represents the CDS spread (level and change) of the 
reference entity i at time t; Micro  represents the microeconomic conditions or, more precisely, a vector 
of firm-specific variables indicative of the financial performance of firm i at time t; Macro  is a vector 
of variables (GDP, stock market, swap rate) that captures the macroeconomic conditions of the relevant 
market; and Crisis  serves as a dummy variable that takes the value “1” for the period 2007Q3-2009Q2 
and zero otherwise. 
To perform our hypothesis testing, two models are derived from equation (M). The formation of Model 
1 is similar to that in Tang and Yan (2007), Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Pires, Pereira and Martins 
(2010) in which CDS spread levels are investigated as the dependent variable and the levels of 
explanatory variables are examined. Model 2 is considered a dynamic version of Model 1 in which ∆CDS 
is used as the dependent variable and changes in both firm performance indicators and macroeconomic 
measures are studied.  
Model 1: 
n
tit
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
ti
n
ti CrisisSWPSVOLSRTNYVOLYGRTROACDS ,765432,1, εβββββββα ++++++++=             (1a) 
n
tit
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
ti
n
ti CrisisSWPSVOLSRTNYVOLYGRTROECDS ,765432,1, εβββββββα ++++++++=        (1b)  
n
tit
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
ti
n
ti CrisisSWPSVOLSRTNYVOLYGRTTBQCDS ,765432,1, εβββββββα ++++++++=       (1c) 
Model 2: 
n
tit
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
ti
n
ti
Crisis
SWPSVOLSRTNYVOLYGRTROACDS
,7
65432,1,
εβ
ββββββα
++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
           (2a)    
n
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t
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t
n
ti
n
ti
Crisis
SWPSVOLSRTNYVOLYGRTROECDS
,7
65432,1,
εβ
ββββββα
++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
          (2b) 
n
tit
n
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n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
ti
n
ti
Crisis
SWPSVOLSRTNYVOLYGRTTBQCDS
,7
65432,1,
εβ
ββββββα
++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
          (2c) 
where, n = 1,..,4 (number of markets). i is the number of reference entities: i = 9 for KOR; i = 8 for HKG; 
i = 54 for FRA; and i = 41 for GER. The sample periods are as follows: 4-Market, 2001Q2 to 2012Q4; KOR, 
2003Q2 to 2012Q4; HKG, 2003Q3 to 2012Q4; FRA, 2001Q2 to 2012Q4; and GER, 2001Q3 to 2012Q4. α 
is the intercept term, β1,. . .,β7 are the slope coefficients, and εni,t is an idiosyncratic error term. 
4.4. Data 
All the data for our estimations are collected from Bloomberg, and calculations are performed wherever 
necessary to compute the required variables. Although daily CDS and stock market index prices are 
available, our samples are constrained by the availability of GDP and firm-level balance sheet and income 
statement data, which are listed only annually (South Korea); semiannually (Hong Kong and France); and 
quarterly (Germany). In the first three cases, following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Tang and Yan 
(2007), and Ericsson et al. (2009), we apply linear interpolation to obtain quarterly data for the first three 
markets. To ensure the dynamic nature of our dataset, we omit firms with inactive CDS spread changes for 
four or more consecutive quarters. In total, we have 112 single-name reference entities with 3931 
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quarterly observations. The names of the reference entities and their credit ratings according to the three 
main ratings agencies are presented in the Appendix. 
Panel A: KOR 
  
Panel B: HKG 
 
Panel C: FRA 
 
Panel D: GER 
 
Figure 1. Individual market – GDP growth, stock market return and 
swap rate movements (level and volatility) 
Figure 1 graphically displays the relationships among our explanatory variables in the four markets 
over time. From the left sides of the four panels, we observe that stock market returns fluctuate more than 
GDP growth and swap rates. These changes are supported by a high degree of stock market volatility in 
the right-hand panels for each market, particularly for HKG and GER. Excess movements in the KOR and 
HKG stock markets during 2007-2008 are also clearly visible. This figure reveals that the global financial 
crisis affected these variables.  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. 4-Market 
Table 3. Estimation results for 4-Market 
Sample period: 2001Q2 to 2012Q4 No. of reference entity = 112, N = 3931 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: ΔCDS 
Eq.1a Eq.1b Eq.1c Eq.2a Eq.2b Eq.2c 
ROA -6.008** 
  
ROA -3.572 
  
 
(-2.041) 
   
(-1.308) 
  ROE 
 
-0.914 
 
ROE 
 
-0.504 
 
  
(-1.407) 
   
(-0.947) 
 TBQ 
  
-129.203*** TBQ 
  
-136.356*** 
   
(-3.130) 
   
(-3.811) 
YGRT -1.833* -1.829* -1.823* YGRT -1.611 -1.611 -1.635 
 
(-1.672) (-1.682) (-1.719) 
 
(-1.224) (-1.227) (-1.280) 
YVOL -0.268 -0.309 -0.416 YVOL -0.785 -0.790 -0.883 
 
(-0.134) (-0.148) (-0.204) 
 
(-0.332) (-0.325) (-0.373) 
SRTN -1.638*** -1.626*** -1.533*** SRTN -1.689*** -1.682*** -1.578*** 
 
(-3.804) (-3.809) (-3.918) 
 
(-4.475) (-4.475) (-4.516) 
SVOL 0.489 0.464 0.538 SVOL 0.416 0.400 0.505 
 
(0.449) (0.427) (0.527) 
 
(0.348) (0.332) (0.430) 
SWP -43.771*** -44.212*** -41.260*** SWP -46.354*** -46.724*** -44.843*** 
 
(-3.048) (-3.022) (-2.933) 
 
(-2.735) (-2.727) (-2.597) 
Crisis 59.645* 59.418* 54.328* Crisis 17.780 18.544 15.405 
 
(1.807) (1.793) (1.743) 
 
(1.031) (1.066) (0.886) 
AR(1) 0.696*** 0.702*** 0.704*** AR(1) -0.005 -0.004 -0.010 
 
(9.286) (9.452) (9.747) 
 
(-0.036) (-0.026) (-0.076) 
Adjusted R2 0.740 0.739 0.741   0.108 0.106 0.115 
Notes: Associated t-ratios in parentheses.  Significant statistics are in bold.  
***, ** and * denote statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Intercept estimates are not shown. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results from the 4-Market aggregated sample. The results from both 
Models 1 and 2 statistically demonstrate that both TBQ and ΔTBQ have explanatory power for CDS and 
ΔCDS, respectively, with the expected signs. Moreover, in all six equations, the highly statistically 
significant coefficients for STRN and ΔSTRN signify that both CDS and ΔCDS decline when stock market 
returns increase and when positive changes in stock market returns occur. Our results are in agreement 
with Galil et al. (2014), who report a negative and significant relationship. As explained above, we are not 
surprised by the existence of these negative slope coefficients, as they indicate that CDS spread levels and 
changes decrease whenever business performance or the macroeconomic environment improves. Further 
explanatory variables that produce consistently significant estimation results are SWP and ΔSWP. Again, 
we obtain the expected signs. The negative coefficients for these variables suggest that a rise in the 
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interest rate leads to a decrease in CDS spread levels and changes, clearly supporting our theoretical 
understanding of their relationship. 
Furthermore, the magnitude and negative sign of all six variables mentioned above demonstrate that the 
economic significance of the firm performance measures (TBQ and ΔTBQ) is rather strong: the factor 
loading on these two variables is three times larger than the factor loading on the risk-free interest rate 
(SWP and ΔSWP) and over 80 times larger than the factor loading on the business climate indicators 
(STRN and ΔSTRN). It is also very interesting that all of the above variables are market value indicators 
rather than book value indicators, implying that risk managers and policy makers should pay more 
attention to market data in forecasting the default risk of the reference entities. The following differences 
in results between Models 1 and 2 are notable: 1) ROA contains information on CDS in the expected 
manner; 2) the recent global financial crisis of 2007-2009 had marginal effects on CDS; and 3) 
adjustments in CDS in response to the explanatory variables are rather slow; hence, significant AR(1) 
coefficients persist in Model 1. 
5.2. KOR and HKG 
Table 4. Estimation results for KOR 
Sample period: 2003Q2 to 2012Q4 No. of reference entity = 9, N = 293 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: ΔCDS 
Eq.1a Eq.1b Eq.1c Eq.2a Eq.2b Eq.2c 
ROA  -5.208**   ROA -1.040   
 (-2.430)    (-0.583)   
ROE  -1.807  ROE  1.744  
  (-1.539)    (1.701)  
TBQ   -14.429 TBQ   48.437 
   (-0.470)    (1.407) 
YGRT -3.191** -3.216** -3.175** YGT -3.634** -3.617** -3.591** 
 (-2.502) (-2.530) (-2.496)  (-2.189) (-2.200) (-2.191) 
YVOL 26.624* 26.506* 25.825* YVOL 31.766** 31.275** 31.515** 
 (1.725) (1.677) (1.673)  (2.265) (2.247) (2.263) 
SRTN -1.116 1.097 -1.071 SRTN -1.222* -1.191* -1.210* 
 (-1.206) (-1.177) (-1.143)  (-1.794) (-1.768) (-1.763) 
SVOL 2.804 2.732 2.309 SVOL 6.591** 6.271** 6.408** 
 (0.760) (0.743) (0.614)  (2.392) (2.323) (2.323) 
SWP -55.220*** -54.400*** -54.772*** SWP -46.574*** -46.644*** -46.6c29*** 
 (-3.889) (-3.762) (-3.703)  (-5.123) (-5.239) (-5.164) 
Crisis 33.596 35.131 33.860 Crisis 21.428 23.052 21.790 
 (1.017) (1.063) (1.059)  (1.378) (1.528) (1.427) 
AR(1) 0.687*** 0.690*** 0.709*** AR(1) -0.169 -0.175 -0.170 
 (5.188) (5.156) (5.153)  (-1.115) (-1.167) (-1.128) 
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.771 0.770  0.426 0.428 0.428 
Notes: Associated t-ratios in parentheses.  Significant statistics are in bold. 
***, ** and * denote statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Intercept estimates are not shown. 
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Table 4 presents the results for KOR. The results of both models show that SWP (ΔSWP), YGRT (ΔYGRT) 
and YVOL (ΔYVOL) contain information on CDS (ΔCDS). Moreover, ΔSRTN and ΔSVOL are found to 
affect ΔCDS, whereas ROA is found to possess explanatory power for CDS. All statistically significant 
coefficients take the expected signs in both the CDS and the ΔCDS spread specifications. Listed in Table 
5, the estimation results for HKG rather differ from those for KOR. Specifically, the reported results show 
that TBQ (ΔTBQ), SRTN (ΔSRTN), SVOL (ΔSVOL), and SWP (ΔSWP) are important determinants of CDS 
(ΔCDS). Again, we obtain the expected signs for all the statistically significant coefficients, and ROA 
continues to be the variable with explanatory power for CDS. 
 Table 5. Estimation results for HKG 
Sample period: 2003Q3 to 2012Q4 No. of reference entity = 8, N = 221 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: ΔCDS 
Eq.1a Eq.1b Eq.1c Eq.2a Eq.2b Eq.2c 
ROA  -3.362**   ROA -2.469   
 (-2.139)    (-0.866)   
ROE  -0.723  ROE  -0.462  
  (-0.631)    (-0.266)  
TBQ   -205.036*** TBQ   -246.519*** 
   (-2.587)    (-2.775) 
YGRT -0.788 -0.839 -0.750 YGT -1.103 -1.126 -1.140 
 (-0.842) (-0.868) (-0.807)  (-1.141) (-1.153) (-1.248) 
YVOL -1.389 -1.421 -1.288 YVOL -1.989 -2.007 -1.850 
 (-0.497) (-0.492) (-0.480)  (-0.802) (-0.792) (-0.812) 
SRTN -2.088*** -2.008*** -1.709*** SRTN -1.919** -1.878** -1.472** 
 (-3.652) (-3.596) (-3.435)  (-2.576) (-2.491) (-2.309) 
SVOL 10.347** 10.761** 8.937** SVOL 15.050*** 15.487*** 13.468*** 
 (2.507) (2.017) (2.100)  (3.509) (3.526) (4.035) 
SWP -44.214** -46.495*** -39.381*** SWP -52.519*** -53.462*** -52.325*** 
 (-3.102) (-2.908) (-2.863)  (-2.923) (-2.867) (-2.988) 
Crisis 45.870 46.178 48.874* Crisis 20.669 22.722 18.881 
 (1.522) (1.448) (1.818)  (1.162) (1.247) (1.297) 
AR(1) 0.605*** 0.616*** 0.609*** AR(1) -0.098 -0.095 -0.110 
 (6.417) (6.372) (6.767)  (-0.503) (-0.494) (-0.615) 
Adjusted R2 0.784 0.782 0.798  0.362 0.359 0.417 
Notes: Associated t-ratios in parentheses.  Significant statistics are in bold. 
***, ** and * denote statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Intercept estimates are not shown. 
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5.3. FRA and GER 
Table 6 presents the results for FRA. As shown, ROA (ΔROA), TBQ (ΔTBQ), YGRT (ΔYGRT), SRTN 
(ΔSRTN), and SWP (ΔSWP) have significant relationships with CDS (ΔCDS). Moreover, ΔROE contains 
information on ΔCDS. While we obtain the expected signs for the significant coefficients except for 
YVOL, this is the first time where we find explanatory power for all firm performance indicators within 
the same model—Model 2. The empirical results for GER are provided in Table 7. Only TBQ (ΔTBQ), 
SRTN (ΔSRTN) and SWP (ΔSWP) exhibit strong deterministic relationships with CDS (ΔCDS). Again, all 
of the statistically significant estimated coefficients take the expected signs.  
Table 6. Estimation results for FRA 
Sample period: 2001Q2 to 2012Q4 No. of reference entity = 54, N = 1919 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS 
Eq.1a Eq.1b Eq.1c Eq.2a Eq.2b Eq.2c 
ROA  -6.818**   ROA -5.324**   
 (-2.128)    (-2.338)   
ROE  -1.179  ROE  -1.014***  
  (-1.641)    (-2.607)  
TBQ   -125.754*** TBQ   -162.213*** 
   (-3.280)    (-3.525) 
YGRT -19.905* -20.065** -18.497* YGT -18.314** -18.352** -17.305** 
 (-1.948) (-1.968) (-1.923)  (-2.015) (-2.018) (-2.076) 
YVOL -148.376** -144.275** -127.526* YVOL -83.340 -81.384 -85.934 
 (-2.096) (-2.030) (-1.822)  (-0.822) (-0.807) (-0.908) 
SRTN -1.873*** -1.883*** -1.867*** SRTN -2.341*** -2.336*** -2.208*** 
 (-3.903) (-3.929) (-4.093)  (-3.994) (-4.020) (-3.995) 
SVOL 3.902 3.855 3.654 SVOL -0.761 -0.629 0.156 
 (0.436) (0.430) (0.420)  (-0.087) (-0.072) (0.019) 
SWP -33.147*** -33.446*** -31.036*** SWP -34.724** -35.497** -33.788** 
 (-2.912) (-2.877) (-2.709)  (-2.373) (-2.390) (-2.280) 
Crisis 40.088 38.633 32.410 Crisis 13.598 13.889 10.363 
 (1.345) (1.296) (1.154)  (1.069) (1.076) (0.804) 
AR(1) 0.718*** 0.724*** 0.741*** AR(1) -0.089 -0.088 -0.089 
 (10.791) (11.172) (11.976)  (-0.791) (0.431) (-0.815) 
Adjusted R2 0.797 0.795 0.797  0.170 0.169 0.178 
Notes: Associated t-ratios in parentheses.  Significant statistics are in bold.  
***, ** and * denote statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Intercept estimates are not shown. 
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Table 7. Estimation results for GER 
Sample period: 2001Q3 to 2012Q4 No. of reference entity = 41, N = 1498 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: CDS 
Eq.1a Eq.1b Eq.1c Eq.2a Eq.2b Eq.2c 
ROA  -5.504   ROA -0.968   
 (-1.278)    (-0.208)   
ROE  -0.610  ROE  0.180  
  (-0.737)    (0.205)  
TBQ   -173.145** TBQ   -113.942** 
   (-2.202)    (-2.556) 
YGRT -1.606 -1.611 -1.652 YGT -1.377 -1.389 -1.413 
 (-0.995) (-1.006) (-1.060)  (-0.934) (-0.939) (-0.982) 
YVOL 7.181 7.073 7.102 YVOL 3.812 3.976 3.448 
 (0.650) (0.654) (0.660)  (0.301) (0.316) (0.280) 
SRTN -1.190*** -1.181*** -1.000*** SRTN -1.207*** -1.196*** -1.094*** 
 (-3.074) (-3.085) (-2.937)  (-3.854) (-3.841) (-3.814) 
SVOL -0.433 -0.454 -0.452 SVOL -0.234 -0.249 -0.214 
 (-0.386) (-0.399) (-0.415)  (-0.230) (-0.238) (-0.208) 
SWP -45.473*** -45.846*** -42.251*** SWP -49.560** -50.056** -47.255** 
 (-2.861) (-2.858) (-2.895)  (-2.309) (-2.328) (-2.167) 
Crisis 73.711* 73.119* 67.759* Crisis 22.174 23.266 18.682 
 (1.719) (1.716) (1.725)  (1.112) (1.157) (0.904) 
AR(1) 0.675*** 0.681*** 0.665*** AR(1) 0.037 0.037 0.032 
 (6.875) (7.005) (6.828)  (0.224) (0.226) (0.194) 
Adjusted R2 0.683 0.682 0.686  0.056 0.056 0.061 
Notes: Associated t-ratios in parentheses.  Significant statistics are in bold.  
***, ** and * denote statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Intercept estimates are not shown. 
5.4. Hypothesis Testing Synopsis 
Synthesizing our overall results, we gather the following statement regarding our four hypotheses:  
(i) TBQ (ΔTBQ) has a significantly negative impact on CDS (ΔCDS) in all samples except for Korea, 
whereas ROA plays a significantly negative role in explaining CDS mainly in the full sample and 
in some individual subsamples. This result lends general support to H1.  
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(ii) SRTN (ΔSRTN) and SWP (ΔSWP) have a significantly negative impact on CDS (ΔCDS) in all 
samples except for Korea, whereas YGDP (ΔYGDP) is significant with the expected sign only for 
Korea and France. Thus, H2 cannot be rejected. Moreover, followed by SWP (ΔSWP) and STRN 
(ΔSTRN) in most cases, TBQ (ΔTBQ) has the greatest magnitude in terms of economic significance 
and a negative sign, which reemphasizes the importance of the market value indicators in 
developing risk management strategy. 
(iii) A significantly positive relationship is observed between Crisis and CDS mainly in the full sample, 
which suggests that H3 is weakly supported. 
(iv) YVOL (ΔYVOL), and in particular SVOL (ΔSVOL) are found to have a significant positive impact 
on CDS (ΔCDS) only in Asian economies, implying that the two Asian markets are more sensitive 
to market volatility. In other words, market players might have more confidence in the two 
European economies, which marginally supports H4.  
6. Robustness 
6.1. Firm Performance Dummy 
To account for all of the firm performance information embedded in ROA, ROE, and TBQ and to enhance 
the robustness of our analysis, we construct a performance dummy (PDMY). This dummy variable is 
created by assigning the value “1” whenever either of the two accounting ratios has a change that is 
greater than zero, and “0” otherwise. In addition to making use of all three performance ratios, this 
performance dummy offers with us the opportunity to resolve the occasions in which one of the ratios is 
either not changing or even changing in the opposite direction of the other two ratios. Such a situation is 
likely to occur when variables measured in both book and market values are used.16 Equations (3a) and 
(3b) below present the structure of the hypothesized relationship.  
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Both the dependent and the explanatory variables are identical to those in Equations (1a) to (2c) above, 
except that firm performance variables such as ROA, ROE and TBQ are now replaced by the two dummy 
variables PDMY and ∆PDMY. 
The estimation results of Equations (3a) and (3b) are presented in Table 8. Generally, we can see that 
the results share a similar pattern with the prior results. However, one difference emerges. In the HKG, 
FRA and GER markets, the prior results indicate that some firm performance indicators are statistically 
significant variables in explaining both CDS and ∆CDS; however, these factors no longer possess 
explanatory power when they are instead captured by PDMY and ∆PDMY. Nevertheless, given the 
consistently significant appearance of the stock market and interest rate variables, overall, the results 
support the claim that our regression results are robust to the use of alternative explanatory variables—in 
the case of performance indicators—and the results from the FRA market further support our contention. 
Overall, we find that in many cases, the differences in the strength of our estimations used to explain CDS 
spread levels and changes are small and that the coefficients take the expected signs. 
                                                 
16 When book values remain stable, market-valued items may fluctuate substantially. 
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 Table 8. Estimation results for firm performance dummy variable  
 Explanatory Variable    
 Panel A: 4-Markets (N = 3931) Adjusted R2 
CDS (Eq.3a) PDMY YGRT YVOL SRTN SVOL SWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -8.454** -1.825* -0.367 -1.596*** 0.463 -44.995*** 57.812* 0.706*** 0.738 
 (-1.816) (-1.686) (-0.174) (-3.875) (0.423) (-2.959) (1.738) (9.573)  
ΔCDS (Eq.3b) ΔPDMY ΔYGRT ΔYVOL ΔSRTN ΔSVOL ΔSWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -7.855** -1.604 -0.791 -1.662*** 0.387 -47.002*** 19.370 -0.004 0.107 
 (-2.044) (-1.226) (-0.327) (-4.434) (0.318) (-2.675) (1.079) (-0.034)  
 Panel B: KOR (N = 293)  
CDS (Eq.3a) PDMY YGRT YVOL SRTN SVOL SWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -1.358 -3.164** 25.800* -1.073 2.289 -54.745*** 33.252 0.712*** 0.770 
 (-0.167) (-2.504) (1.675) (-1.146) -0.604 (-3.715) (1.050) (5.073)  
ΔCDS (Eq.3b) ΔPDMY ΔYGRT ΔYVOL ΔSRTN ΔSVOL ΔSWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -0.041 -3.637** 31.678** -1.214* 6.534** -46.399*** 21.825 -0.169 0.426 
 (-0.006) (-2.192) (2.255) (-1.784) (2.381) (-5.099) (1.420) (-1.114)  
 Panel C: HKG (N = 221)  
CDS (Eq.3a) PDMY YGRT YVOL SRTN SVOL SWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -0.593 -0.865 -1.429 -1.958*** 10.856* -47.553*** 46.580 0.619*** 0.781 
 (-0.045) (-0.898) (-0.491) (-3.381) (1.873) (-2.927) (1.449) (6.405)  
ΔCDS (Eq.3b) ΔPDMY ΔYGRT ΔYVOL ΔSRTN ΔSVOL ΔSWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -1.421 -1.136 -2.017 -1.856** 15.493*** -53.678*** 23.507 -0.094 0.359 
 (-0.097) (-1.179) (-0.795 (-2.439) (3.185) (-2.829) (1.358) (-0.492)  
 Panel D: FRA (N = 1919)  
CDS (Eq.3a) PDMY YGRT YVOL SRTN SVOL SWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -18.052*** -19.853* -143.664* -1.849*** 3.507 -33.897*** 35.055 0.731*** 0.795 
 (-2.702) (-1.940) (-1.943) (-4.020) (0.394) (-2.881) (1.203) (11.644)  
ΔCDS (Eq.3b) ΔPDMY ΔYGRT ΔYVOL ΔSRTN ΔSVOL ΔSWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -18.444*** -17.618** -82.392 -2.283*** -1.080 -36.098** 15.027 -0.085 0.171 
 (-3.025) (-1.988) (-0.839) (-4.069) (-0.125) (-2.390) (1.142) (-0.760)  
 Panel E: GER (N = 1498)  
CDS (Eq.3a) PDMY YGRT YVOL SRTN SVOL SWP Crisis AR(1)  
 -0.484 -1.637 7.199 -1.163*** -0.448 -46.819*** 72.821* 0.684*** 0.681 
 (-0.103) (-1.204) (0.673) (-3.086) (-0.398) (-2.769) (1.699) (7.166)  
ΔCDS (Eq.3b) ΔPDMY ΔYGRT ΔYVOL ΔSRTN ΔSVOL ΔSWP Crisis AR(1)  
 1.060 -1.390 3.853 -1.203*** -0.251 -49.846** 22.740 0.038 0.056 
 (0.271) (-0.938) (0.305) (-3.973) (-0.238) (-2.245) (1.058) (0.226)  
Notes: Associated t-ratios in parentheses. Intercept estimates are not shown.    
Significant statistics are in bold.  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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6.2. Analyses of the Goodness-of-Fit and Redundant Fixed-Effects Test Statistics 
 Figure 2. Goodness-of-Fit analysis  
To gauge the goodness-of-fit of our regressions, we also performed an analysis of the adjusted R2. Figure 
2 displays values of the adjusted R2 associated with all of the regressions that we have estimated. From the 
top half of the figure for models with CDS as the dependent variable, we observe that GER has the lowest 
goodness-of-fit results, while FRA yields the highest goodness-of-fit values. Moreover, all four 
performance measures produce comparable adjusted R2 values within an approximately 10% range. The 
bottom half of the figure for models with ΔCDS as the dependent variable shows that GER again has the 
lowest adjusted R2 and that KOR yields the best goodness-of-fit results. Indeed, the goodness-of-fit 
difference between these four performance measures and the five market categories has widened 
substantially to approximately 37%.17 In other words, our results suggest that reference entities with lower 
credit ratings such as those in KOR and HKG exhibit greater explanatory power than those in other 
markets. Although this observation diverges from the results of Avramov, Jostova and Philipov (2007) and 
Ericsson et al. (2009), it is in line with those of Huang and Huang (2003) and Galil et al. (2014). As 
shown in Figure 2, regressions employing CDS spread levels as the dependent variable (Model 1) produce 
a set of relatively high adjusted R2 values that range from 0.681 to 0.798, whereas those using CDS spread 
changes as the dependent variable (Model 2) generate relatively lower adjusted R2 values that range from 
0.056 to 0.428.18 However, according to the redundant fixed-effects test F-statistics,19  although Model 2 
                                                 
17 See, for example, ∆ROE, which has the largest difference (0.428 - 0.056) = 0.372. 
18As further support for our claim, the models estimated by Galil et al. (2014) and Ericsson et al. (2009) using US 
CDS data yield only an explanatory power of 16.23% and 23%, respectively. 
19The summary of redundant fixed effects test F-statistics is available upon request. 
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generates lower adjusted R2 values, it seems to produce less biased results than Model 1. Therefore, to 
ensure the robustness of our results, we maintain that a model with a reasonably good adjusted R2 value 
and relatively smaller F-statistics would be preferred and considered more reliable to derive our 
conclusion. Accordingly, estimation results using ∆CDS as the dependent variable together with changes 
in certain explanatory variables appears to yield findings that fulfill these criteria. 
7. Conclusions  
This paper attempts to study the determinants of CDS spread levels and changes by using a panel dataset 
covering 112 reference entities from four markets over the period 2001-2012. Employing a structural 
model, we establish eight equations incorporating variables that could affect the default risk of a reference 
entity and hence CDS spreads. Our empirical results suggest that both firm performance and 
macroeconomic conditions possess significant explanatory power for CDS spreads; however, market 
value indicators (i.e., Tobin’s Q, stock market returns and the interest rate) appear to be much more 
important than book value indicators (i.e., ROA, ROE, and GDP growth rate) in determining CDS spread 
levels and changes. Followed by the interest rate and stock market returns, Tobin’s Q demonstrates the 
strongest economic significance among the market value indicators. Therefore, both H1 and H2 cannot be 
rejected. H3 also cannot be rejected because the global financial crisis of 2007 significantly affect global 
CDS markets as a whole, but it generally did not affect the individual markets under study. The results 
also show that only the Asian CDS markets in the sample are sensitive to both GDP and stock market 
volatility, whereas the two European markets are free from such an impact. This finding lends clear 
support to H4, which argues for the existence of geographic effects.  
On the basis of our empirical results, we can assert that any government policy that could help provide 
a stable stock market and generate economic growth would facilitate the functioning of CDS markets and 
thus enhance the use of CDSs as a risk management tool for the investment community. In particular, both 
risk managers and financial regulators are encouraged to devote greater attention to the market value 
indicators of firm performance and macroeconomic conditions. Considerable weight should be given to 
Tobin’s Q, the risk-free interest rate and stock market returns in risk pricing. For actors dealing with CDSs 
in Asian markets, economic and stock market volatility should also be covered closely. Notwithstanding, 
while some fundamental determinants of CDSs remain elusive, further research on this subject by 
extending the number of markets and embracing some market-specific geopolitical variables that help 
produce a more precise picture of the effect of market factors on CDS pricing across countries would 
certainly be beneficial. This paper contributes to the research of CDS determinants in two ways. Firstly we 
highlight the importance of market/geographic effect, and secondly, to our best knowledge, we are the 
first to test for the explanatory power of our three firm performance – market and book value indicators in 
the formation and movements of CDS spreads. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. CDS reference entity 
KOR (Total 9)  HKG (Total 8) 
Reference Entity Moody Fitch S&P  Reference Entity Moody Fitch S&P 
Hana Bank A3 A+ A  Hutchison Whampoa Ltd A1 AA- A+ 
Hyundai Motor Co A3 A+ A  Hysan Development Co Ltd A1 AA- A+ 
Industrial Bank of Korea A3 A A-  Jardine Strategic Holdings Ltd A1 AA- A+ 
Kookmin Bank A3 A A-  MTR Corp Ltd A1 AA- A+ 
Korea Electric Power Corp A3 A A-  Noble Group Ltd Aa2 AA- AA 
KT Corp A3 A A-  Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd Aa2 AA- AA+ 
POSCO A3 A A-  Swire Pacific Ltd A1 AA- A+ 
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd A3 A A-  Wharf Holdings Ltd A1 AA- A+ 
SK Telecom Co Ltd A3 A A-      
FRA (Total 54) 
Accor SA Aaa AAA AAA  Natixis Aaa AAA AAA 
Air Liquide SA Aaa AAA AAA  Natixis (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA 
Alcatel-Lucent/France Aaa AAA AAA  Pernod-Ricard SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Alstom SA Aaa AAA AAA  Peugeot SA Aaa AAA AAA 
AXA SA Aaa AAA AAA  PPR Aaa AAA AAA 
AXA SA (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA  Publicis Groupe SA Aaa AAA AAA 
BNP Paribas SA Aaa AAA AAA  Rallye SA Aaa AAA AAA 
BNP Paribas SA (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA  Renault SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Bouygues SA Aaa AAA AAA  Rhodia SA Aaa AAA AAA 
(To be continued on the next page) 
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Appendix 1. CDS reference entity (To continue) 
Cap Gemini SA Aaa AAA AAA  Sanofi Aaa AAA AAA 
Carrefour SA Aaa AAA AAA  Schneider Electric SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Casino Guichard Perrachon SA Aaa AAA AAA  SCOR SE Aaa AAA AAA 
Cie de St-Gobain Aaa AAA AAA  SCOR SE (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA 
Credit Agricole SA Aaa AAA AAA  Societe Generale SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Credit Agricole SA (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA  Societe Generale SA (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA 
Credit Lyonnais SA Aaa AAA AAA  Societe Television Francaise 1 Aaa AAA AAA 
Credit Lyonnais SA (Sub) Aaa AAA AAA  Sodexo Aaa AAA AAA 
Danone SA Aaa AAA AAA  Suez SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Electricite de France SA Aaa AAA AAA  Technip SA Aaa AAA AAA 
European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Co NV Aaa AAA AAA 
 
Thales SA Aaa AAA AAA 
France Telecom SA Aaa AAA AAA  Total SA Aaa AAA AAA 
GDF Suez Aaa AAA AAA  Unibail-Rodamco SE Aaa AAA AAA 
Gecina SA Aaa AAA AAA  Valeo SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Havas SA Aaa AAA AAA  Veolia Environnement SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Klepierre Aaa AAA AAA  Vinci SA Aaa AAA AAA 
Lafarge SA Aaa AAA AAA  Vivendi SA Aaa AAA AAA 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton SA Aaa AAA AAA 
 
Wendel SA Aaa AAA AAA 
GER (Total 41) 
Allianz SE Aaa AAA AAAu  Henkel AG & Co KGaA Aaa AAA AAAu 
Allianz SE (Sub) Aaa AAA AAAu  IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
BASF SE Aaa AAA AAAu  Lanxess AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Bayer AG Aaa AAA AAAu  Linde AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG Aaa AAA AAAu  MAN SE Aaa AAA AAAu 
Commerzbank AG Aaa AAA AAAu  Merck KGaA Aaa AAA AAAu 
Commerzbank AG (Sub) Aaa AAA AAAu  Metro AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Continental AG Aaa AAA AAAu  Muenchener Rueckversicherungs AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Daimler AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
 Muenchener Rueckversicherungs AG 
(Sub) Aaa AAA AAAu 
Deutsche Bank AG Aaa AAA AAAu  Porsche Automobil Holding SE Aaa AAA AAAu 
Deutsche Bank AG (Sub) Aaa AAA AAAu  ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG Aaa AAA AAAu  Rheinmetall AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Deutsche Post AG Aaa AAA AAAu  RWE AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Deutsche Telekom AG Aaa AAA AAAu  Siemens AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
E.ON SE Aaa AAA AAAu  Suedzucker AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
EnBW Energie Baden-
Wuerttemberg AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
 
ThyssenKrupp AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Evonik Degussa GmbH Aaa AAA AAAu  TUI AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Fresenius SE & Co KGaA Aaa AAA AAAu  UniCredit Bank AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG Aaa AAA AAAu  UniCredit Bank AG (Sub) Aaa AAA AAAu 
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 
(Sub) Aaa AAA AAAu 
 
Volkswagen AG Aaa AAA AAAu 
HeidelbergCement AG Aaa AAA AAAu      
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